{"id":389,"date":"2007-01-28T19:13:08","date_gmt":"2007-01-29T00:13:08","guid":{"rendered":"\/?p=389"},"modified":"2009-02-03T14:39:51","modified_gmt":"2009-02-03T19:39:51","slug":"stern-science","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.realclimate.org\/index.php\/archives\/2007\/01\/stern-science\/","title":{"rendered":"Stern Science La science de Stern<\/lang_fr>A ci\u00eancia de Stern<\/lang_po>"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

Halld\u00f3r Bj\u00f6rnsson<\/a>, William Connolley and Gavin Schmidt<\/small><\/p>\n

Late last year, the UK Treasury’s Stern Review<\/a> of the Economics of Climate Change was released to rapturous reception from all sides of the UK political spectrum (i.e. left<\/a> and right<\/a>). Since then it has been subject to significant criticism and debate (for a good listing see Rabbett Run<\/a>). Much of that discussion has revolved around the economic (and ethical) issues associated with ‘discounting’ (how you weight welfare in the future against welfare today) – particularly Nordhaus’s review<\/a>. We are not qualified to address those issues, and so have not previously commented.<\/p>\n

However, as exemplified by interviews on a recent Radio 4 program<\/a> (including with our own William Connolley), some questions have involved the science that underlies the economics. We will try and address those.
\nHalld\u00f3r Bj\u00f6rnsson<\/a>, William Connolley and Gavin Schmidt (traduit par Etienne Pesnelle)<\/small><\/p>\n

A la fin de l’an dernier, le Tr\u00e9sor britannique a publi\u00e9 le rapport Stern <\/a> sur les cons\u00e9quences \u00e9conomiques du changement climatique, qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 re\u00e7u avec enthousiasme par l’ensemble de la classe politique du Royaume-Uni, c’est \u00e0 dire la gauche <\/a> et la droite <\/a> Depuis, il a fait l’objet de nombreux d\u00e9bats et critiques (voir la liste qu’a \u00e9tablie Rabbett Run). L’essentiel de la discussion a tourn\u00e9 autour des probl\u00e8mes \u00e9conomiques (et \u00e9thiques) associ\u00e9s \u00e0 “l’actualisation” (c’est-\u00e0-dire comment mesurer le bien-\u00eatre futur \u00e0 l’aune du bien-\u00eatre actuel), ce dont traite notamment Nordhaus <\/a>. Nous ne sommes pas qualifi\u00e9s pour discuter de ces points, aussi ne les avons-nous pas comment\u00e9s pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment. <\/p>\n

Toutefois, comme l’illustrent les interviews donn\u00e9es lors d’une \u00e9mission r\u00e9cente de Radio 4 <\/a> (dont une avec notre William Connolley), certaines questions ont concern\u00e9 la science qui sous-tend les calculs \u00e9conomiques. Nous allons essayer de les aborder. <\/lang_fr>
\nHalld\u00f3r Bj\u00f6rnsson<\/a>, William Connolley e Gavin Schmidt (traduzido por F. M. Ramos e I. B. T. Lima)<\/p>\n

No fim do ano passado, o Tesouro brit\u00e2nico publicou o Relat\u00f3rio Stern<\/a> sobre as conseq\u00fc\u00eancias econ\u00f4micas das mudan\u00e7as clim\u00e1ticas, que foi recebido com entusiasmo pelo conjunto da classe pol\u00edtica do Reino Unido, isto \u00e9 a esquerda<\/a> e a direita<\/a>. Depois, ele foi objeto de in\u00fameros debates e cr\u00edticas (ver a lista que preparou Rabbett Run<\/a>). O essencial da discuss\u00e3o realizou-se em torno dos problemas econ\u00f4micos (e \u00e9ticos) associados \u00e0 \u201catualiza\u00e7\u00e3o\u201d (isto \u00e9, como medir o bem-estar futuro em compara\u00e7\u00e3o ao bem-estar atual) \u2013 particularmente o Relat\u00f3rio Nordhaus<\/a>. N\u00f3s n\u00e3o estamos qualificados para comentar estes assuntos, assim como n\u00e3o comentamos no passado.<\/p>\n

No entanto, como ilustram as entrevistas concedidas durante um recente programa de Radio
\n4<\/a> (das quais uma com William Connolley), certas quest\u00f5es diziam respeito \u00e0 ci\u00eancia que sustenta os c\u00e1lculos econ\u00f4micos. Vamos tentar abord\u00e1-las a seguir. Ao contr\u00e1rio de um relat\u00f3rio mais antigo da C\u00e2mara dos Lordes<\/a>, Stern n\u00e3o perde tempo tentando trapacear, e essencialmente busca a ci\u00eancia no relat\u00f3rio do IPCC, com algumas atualiza\u00e7\u00f5es de trabalhos mais recentes. A maior parte da ci\u00eancia est\u00e1 resumida no cap\u00edtulo um, e um leitor casual familiarizado com o relat\u00f3rio IPCC encontrar\u00e1 poucas surpresas em se\u00e7\u00f5es que incluem afirma\u00e7\u00f5es como \u201cUma massa esmagadora de evid\u00eancias cient\u00edficas indica que o clima da Terra est\u00e1 mudando rapidamente, predominantemente pelo efeito do crescimento dos gases de efeito estufa causado pelas atividades humanas\u201d etc. Entretanto, as possibilidades cient\u00edficas em Stern s\u00e3o ponderadas de maneira levemente diferente que nos relat\u00f3rios do IPCC uma vez que, como ele afirma, \u201cos tomadores de decis\u00e3o devem levar em conta os riscos extremos, al\u00e9m das previs\u00f5es m\u00e9dias, por que seria muito grave se estes riscos viessem a se materializar\u201d (Stern reply to Byatt et al<\/a>).<\/p>\n

H\u00e1 tr\u00eas componentes cient\u00edficas no relat\u00f3rio Stern: a sensibilidade clim\u00e1tica, as emiss\u00f5es futuras dos gases de efeito estufa, e os impactos de uma dada mudan\u00e7a, expressas na forma de anomalia de temperatura global por raz\u00f5es de comodidade. <\/p>\n

A sensibilidade clim\u00e1tica (j\u00e1 discutida aqui<\/a> anteriormente) foi considerada como provavelmente estando no intervalo de 1.5 a 4.5 C do IPCC TAR, e no intervalo de 2 a 5 C nos modelos utilizados no relat\u00f3rio Stern. No entanto, a probabilidade de valores maiores tem um papel importante no relat\u00f3rio. Especificamente, Meinshausen* (2006) [estabelece] que h\u00e1 \u201centre 2% a 20% de probabilidade que o aquecimento possa ser maior que 5 C\u201d. Isto \u00e9 verdade, mas o relat\u00f3rio esquece de mencionar que outros novos estudos (Annan and Hargreaves; Hegerl et al) sugerem que \u00e9 insignificante a probabilidade que a sensibilidade clim\u00e1tica seja superior a 5 C.<\/p>\n

A incerteza sobre o aquecimento futuro n\u00e3o se reduz \u00e0 incerteza sobre a sensibilidade, mas depende tamb\u00e9m daquela relacionada aos n\u00edveis futuros dos gases de efeito estufa (GEE). Existe uma ampla gama de cen\u00e1rios e de estimativas sobre n\u00edveis futuros de GEE que s\u00e3o utilizados nos relat\u00f3rios do IPCC. O cen\u00e1rio utilizado pelo Relat\u00f3rio Stern \u00e9 o A2, mas neste cen\u00e1rio, os n\u00edveis de GEE na segunda metade do s\u00e9culo XXI s\u00e3o superiores \u00e0queles do cen\u00e1rio A1b, por exemplo. A quest\u00e3o n\u00e3o \u00e9 se o cen\u00e1rio A2 \u00e9 menos s\u00f3lido que o A1, mas simplesmente que o Relat\u00f3rio Stern escolheu trabalhar com um dos cen\u00e1rios de \u201cfortes emiss\u00f5es\u201d. Al\u00e9m disso, o relat\u00f3rio reconhece tamb\u00e9m a grande incerteza (mas n\u00e3o claramente quantific\u00e1vel) de feedbacks positivos nas emiss\u00f5es de CO2 e CH4 de origem natural. <\/p>\n

Com rela\u00e7\u00e3o aos impactos das mudan\u00e7as clim\u00e1ticas, a est\u00f3ria \u00e9 semelhante: a maior parte dos impactos s\u00e3o declarados mas sua probabilidade de ocorr\u00eancia \u00e9 sujeita \u00e0 debate. Por exemplo: o enfraquecimento da corrente termohalina sob 1 grau de aquecimento, risco de colapso em 3 graus, risco de derretimento irrevers\u00edvel da calota de gelo da Groenl\u00e2ndia para um aquecimento de 2 graus, a eleva\u00e7\u00e3o dos mares de 5 a 12 metros durante muitos s\u00e9culos, – estas eventualidades s\u00e3o question\u00e1veis, e deveriam ser consideradas como \u201co cen\u00e1rio adverso\u201d dentre os poss\u00edveis impactos. <\/p>\n

Em conclus\u00e3o: Stern de um modo geral utiliza bem a ci\u00eancia do clima, mas desvia-se para o lado das estimativas mais impactantes e as utiliza em seu sum\u00e1rio. Este vi\u00e9s altista faz com que o relat\u00f3rio seja vulner\u00e1vel a acusa\u00e7\u00f5es de \u201calarmismo\u201d. O relat\u00f3rio \u00e9 justo em apontar que os danos e seus custos crescem de maneira desproporcional com o aumento da mudan\u00e7a de temperatura e portanto, dada esta assimetria, os tomadores de decis\u00e3o t\u00eam raz\u00e3o de lev\u00e1-los em conta. Entretanto, parece que a maior cr\u00edtica deste relat\u00f3rio ser\u00e1 atribu\u00edda (em outros foros) \u00e0 parte econ\u00f4mica. <\/p>\n

NB: De modo previs\u00edvel, alguns dos \u201cc\u00e9ticos\u201d habituais atacaram<\/a> igualmente a ci\u00eancia do relat\u00f3rio Stern. No entanto, uma indica\u00e7\u00e3o de sua falta fundamental de seriedade \u00e9 que, quando h\u00e1 realmente importantes incertezas (por exemplo, a probabilidade de que a sensibilidade seja superior \u00e0quela geralmente estimada), eles as ignoram para fazer as mesmas<\/a> repetitivas, desinteressantes e incorretas<\/a> afirma\u00e7\u00f5es que sempre fazem.<\/p>\n

*Meinshausen, M. (2006): ‘What does a 2C target mean for greenhouse gas concentrations? A brief analysis based on multi-gas emission pathways and several climate sensitivity uncertainty estimates’ (“O que significa um alvo de +2\u00b0C em termos de concentra\u00e7\u00e3o de g\u00e1s de efeito estufa? Uma r\u00e1pida an\u00e1lise fundamentada em caminhos de emiss\u00e3o multi-g\u00e1s e v\u00e1rias estimativas de incerteza da sensibilidade clim\u00e1tica”), Avoiding dangerous climate change (Evitando uma perigosa mudan\u00e7a clim\u00e1tica), in H.J. Schellnhuber et al. (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 265 a 280.<\/small><\/lang_po>
\n<\/p>\n

Unlike an earlier report by the House of Lords<\/a>, Stern spends no time quibbling, and essentially takes the science from the IPCC report, though somewhat updated by more recent work. Most of the science is flipped through fairly quickly within chapter one, and casual readers familiar with the IPCC report will find little to surprise them with sections including statements such as “An overwhelming body of scientific evidence indicates that the Earth\u2019s climate is rapidly changing, predominantly as a result of increases in greenhouse gases caused by human activities” etc. However, the scientific possibilities in Stern are weighted slightly differently than in the IPCC reports since, as he states, “policymakers need to take into account the risks of greater dangers, as well as central expectations, because the consequences if these risks were to materialise would be very serious” (Stern reply to Byatt et al<\/a>).<\/p>\n

There are three strands to the science in Stern: the climate sensitivity, future emissions of greenhouse gases and the impacts of any particular level of change (scaled to the global mean temperature anomaly for convenience). <\/p>\n

The climate sensitivity (as discussed here previously<\/a>) was given a likely range of 1.5 – 4.5 C in IPCC TAR, and with a range of 2 – 5 C in the models used in that report. However, the probability of higher values plays a significant role in the report. Specifically, Meinshausen (2006) that there is “between a 2% and 20% chance that climate sensitivity is greater than 5C” but in the key message section of chapter 1 this is distilled as: “Several new studies suggest up to a 20% chance that warming could be greater than 5C”. This is true, but the report neglects to mention other new studies (Annan and Hargreaves; Hegerl et al) that suggest a negligible probability of CS greater than 5 C.<\/p>\n

Uncertainty about future warming is not just the uncertainty about sensitivity, but also about the future greenhouse gas levels (GHG). There is a wide range of scenarios and estimates of future GHG levels that are used in the IPCC reports. The scenario used by the Review is the A2 one, but in this scenario GHG in the latter part of the 21st century is higher than in say, the A1b scenario. The point here is not that A2 is less sound than the A1b scenario, but simply that the Review chooses to work with one of the “high emission” scenarios. Additionally, the report also acknowledges the highly uncertain (but not clearly quantifiable) the possibilities of positive feedbacks in natural CO2 and CH4 emissions. <\/p>\n

For impacts of climate change the story is similar: many of the impacts mentioned possible but their likelihood is debatable. For example, the weakening of the THC under 1 degree of warming, a risk of collapse for 3 degrees, risk of irreversible melting of the Greenland Ice sheet at 2 degrees warming, sea level changes of 5 – 12 meters over several centuries, – these eventualities are debatable, and should certainly be viewed as the “adverse tail” of possible impacts.<\/p>\n

In conclusion: Stern gets the climate science largely right, though he strays on the high side of various estimates and picks the high side to talk about in the summary. This high-end bias lends the Review open to charges of “alarmism”. The report does make the fair point that the damages and their cost grows disproportionally with increasing temperature change and so, given that asymmetry, policymakers are correct in taking note of them. However, it looks like the major criticism of his work will be directed (in other fora) at the economics.<\/p>\n

NB. Rather predictably, some of the usual contrarian suspects have also attacked<\/a> the science in Stern. It is, however, a measure of their fundamental lack of seriousness that when there really are important uncertainties (i.e. the likelihood that climate sensitivity is higher than generally thought), they ignore them in favour of making the same<\/a> repetitive uninteresting and incorrect<\/a> claims they always make.<\/small><\/p>\n

*Meinshausen, M. (2006): ‘What does a 2C target mean for greenhouse gas concentrations? A brief analysis based on multi-gas emission pathways and several climate sensitivity uncertainty estimates’, Avoiding dangerous climate change, in H.J. Schellnhuber et al. (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.265 280.<\/small>
\n<\/p>\n

Contrairement \u00e0 un rapport plus ancien de la Chambre des Lords <\/a>, Stern ne perd pas de temps \u00e0 chicaner, et il va essentiellement chercher les \u00e9l\u00e9ments scientifiques dans le rapport du GIEC, avec parfois des mises \u00e0 jour issues de r\u00e9cent travaux. La plupart de ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments semble avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 rapidement r\u00e9colt\u00e9e en feuilletant le premier chapitre, et le lecteur un tant soit peu familier du rapport du GIEC trouvera peu de choses qui le surprendront dans des chapitres o\u00f9 on trouve des assertions comme “une masse \u00e9crasante de preuves scientifiques indique que le climat terrestre est en train de changer rapidement, essentiellement du fait de l’augmentation des gaz \u00e0 effet de serre g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9s par les activit\u00e9s humaines”, etc. Cependant, les perspectives scientifiques de Stern sont pond\u00e9r\u00e9es de fa\u00e7on l\u00e9g\u00e8rement diff\u00e9rentes de celles des rapports du GIEC puisque, d\u00e9clare-t-il, “les d\u00e9cideurs doivent prendre en compte les risques de dangers extr\u00eames, en plus des pr\u00e9visions moyennes, car les cons\u00e9quences de tels risques, s’ils se mat\u00e9rialisaient, seraient tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieuses” ( r\u00e9ponse de Stern \u00e0 Byatt et al <\/a>). <\/p>\n

Il y a trois composantes scientifiques dans le rapport Stern : la sensibilit\u00e9 climatique, les \u00e9missions futures de gaz \u00e0 effet de serre et les impacts d’un changement donn\u00e9, exprim\u00e9 en anomalie de temp\u00e9rature globale pour raison de commodit\u00e9. <\/p>\n

La sensibilit\u00e9 climatique (d\u00e9j\u00e0 discut\u00e9e ici <\/a> pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment) \u00e9tait donn\u00e9e comme probablement dans la fourchette 1,5-4,5 \u00b0C par le Troisi\u00e8me Rapport d’Evaluation (TRE) du GIEC, et comprise dans la fourchette 2-5\u00b0C par les mod\u00e8les utilis\u00e9s dans le rapport Stern. Cependant, la probabilit\u00e9 d’atteindre des valeurs sup\u00e9rieures joue un r\u00f4le significatif dans le rapport. En particulier, Meinshausen* (2006) [\u00e9tablit] qu’il y a “entre 2% \u00e0 20% de probabilit\u00e9 que la sensibilit\u00e9 climatique est sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 5\u00b0C” , mais dans le r\u00e9sum\u00e9 du chapitre 1 ceci est condens\u00e9 en “de nombreuses nouvelles \u00e9tudes semblent indiquer qu’il y a jusqu’\u00e0 20% de probabilit\u00e9 que le r\u00e9chauffement pourrait \u00eatre sup\u00e9rieur \u00e0 5\u00b0C”. Cela est vrai, mais le rapport n\u00e9glige de mentionner d’autres nouvelles \u00e9tudes (Annan et Hargreaves ; Hegerl et al) qui semblent indiquer le caract\u00e8re n\u00e9gligeable de la probabilit\u00e9 que la sensibilit\u00e9 climatique soit sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 5\u00b0C. <\/p>\n

L’incertitude sur le r\u00e9chauffement futur ne se r\u00e9duit pas \u00e0 l’incertitude sur la sensibilit\u00e9, mais d\u00e9pend aussi de celle sur les niveaux futurs des gaz \u00e0 effet de serre (GES). Il y a une grande batterie de sc\u00e9narios et d’estimations des niveaux futurs des GES qui sont utilis\u00e9s dans les rapports du GIEC. Le sc\u00e9nario utilis\u00e9 par le Rapport Stern est le A2, mais, dans ce sc\u00e9nario, les niveaux de GES dans la seconde partie du 21\u00e8me si\u00e8cle sont sup\u00e9rieurs \u00e0 ceux du sc\u00e9nario A1, par exemple. La question ici n’est pas que le sc\u00e9nario A2 est moins solide que le A1, mais simplement que le Rapport Stern a choisi de travailler avec un des sc\u00e9narios “\u00e0 fortes \u00e9missions”. En plus, le rapport reconna\u00eet aussi la grande incertitude (mais pas clairement quantifiable) des possibilit\u00e9s de r\u00e9troactions positives des \u00e9missions de CO2 d’origine naturelle et de m\u00e9thane. <\/p>\n

De m\u00eame pour les impacts du changement climatique : la plupart des impacts sont d\u00e9clar\u00e9s possibles mais leur probabilit\u00e9 d’occurrence est mati\u00e8re \u00e0 d\u00e9bat. Par exemple : l’affaiblissement de la circulation thermohaline en-dessous d’un degr\u00e9 de r\u00e9chauffement, le risque d’effondrement pour 3 degr\u00e9s, le risque de fonte irr\u00e9versible de la calotte du Groenland pour un r\u00e9chauffement de 2 degr\u00e9s, l’\u00e9l\u00e9vation de 5 \u00e0 12 m\u00e8tres du niveau des mers sur plusieurs si\u00e8cles – ces \u00e9ventualit\u00e9s sont mati\u00e8re \u00e0 d\u00e9bat, et ne devraient certainement pas \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9es comme le “plus petit commun multiple” des impacts possibles. <\/p>\n

En conclusion : Stern a largement bien utilis\u00e9 la climatologie, bien qu’il se soit \u00e9gar\u00e9 parmi les fourchettes hautes des nombreuses estimations et qu’il les ait prises comme r\u00e9f\u00e9rence dans son r\u00e9sum\u00e9. Ce parti pris haut de gamme fait qu’on peut accuser son rapport d’ “alarmisme” : il ne souligne pas, alors que c’est juste, que les dommages et leurs co\u00fbts augmentent de fa\u00e7on non proportionnelle avec la temp\u00e9rature et que, compte tenu de cette asym\u00e9trie, les d\u00e9cideurs ont justement raison d’en prendre note. Toutefois, il semble que la critique majeure de cette oeuvre concernera (sur d’autres forums) sa partie \u00e9conomique.<\/p>\n

NB. De fa\u00e7on plut\u00f4t pr\u00e9visible, quelques-uns des \u00ab sceptiques \u00bb habituels ont \u00e9galement mis en cause <\/a> la climatologie utilis\u00e9e dans le rapport Stern. Cependant, une indication de leur manque fondamental de s\u00e9rieux est que, lorsqu’il y a vraiment d’importantes incertitudes (ex : la probabilit\u00e9 que la sensibilit\u00e9 climatique est sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 celle g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement estim\u00e9e), ils les ignorent pour continuer \u00e0 faire les m\u00eames <\/a> contestations r\u00e9p\u00e9titives et inint\u00e9ressantes <\/a> qu’ils ont toujours faites.<\/p>\n

*Meinshausen, M. (2006): ‘What does a 2C target mean for greenhouse gas concentrations? A brief analysis based on multi-gas emission pathways and several climate sensitivity uncertainty estimates’ (“Que signifie une cible de +2\u00b0C en terme de concentration de gaz \u00e0 effet de serre ? Une rapide analyse fond\u00e9e sur les sch\u00e9mas d’\u00e9missions multi-gaz et plusieurs estimations de l’incertitude de la sensibilit\u00e9 climatique”), Avoiding dangerous climate change (Eviter un dangereux changement climatique), in H.J. Schellnhuber et al. (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pages.265 \u00e0 280.
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Halld\u00f3r Bj\u00f6rnsson, William Connolley and Gavin Schmidt Late last year, the UK Treasury’s Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change was released to rapturous reception from all sides of the UK political spectrum (i.e. left and right). Since then it has been subject to significant criticism and debate (for a good listing see Rabbett […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"_genesis_hide_title":false,"_genesis_hide_breadcrumbs":false,"_genesis_hide_singular_image":false,"_genesis_hide_footer_widgets":false,"_genesis_custom_body_class":"","_genesis_custom_post_class":"","_genesis_layout":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[5,1,11,23,28],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-389","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","6":"category-climate-modelling","7":"category-climate-science","8":"category-extras","9":"category-ipcc","10":"category-reviews","11":"entry"},"aioseo_notices":[],"post_mailing_queue_ids":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.realclimate.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/389","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.realclimate.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.realclimate.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.realclimate.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.realclimate.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=389"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.realclimate.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/389\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.realclimate.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=389"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.realclimate.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=389"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.realclimate.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=389"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}